We also thank seminar participants at the University of Chicago, UCLA, and Yale University, and conference participants at the JAE Conference, FARS Midyear Meetings, the CMU-Pitt-PSU Finance Conference, the Computing in Economics and Finance Annual Conference, the Northern Finance Association Conference, Stanford Summer Camp, and the University of Washington Summer Finance Conference. Ramesh, Haresh Sapra, Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, Chester Spatt, Shyam Sunder, Chris Telmer, Jake Thomas, Shawn Thomas, Phong Truong, Yizhou Xiao, Anastasia Zakolyukina, Frank Zhang, and Frank Zhou (discussant) for helpful comments and discussion.

We also thank David Aboody, Cagla Akin, Brian Akins, Phil Berger, Pietro Bonaldi, Jonathan Bonham, Brian Bushee, Judson Caskey, Nicholas Chen, Si Cheng, Alan Crane, Kevin Crotty, David De Angelis, Karl Diether (discussant), Aytekin Ertan, Paul Fischer, Henry Friedman, John Gallemore, Pingyang Gao, Zhenyu Gao, Matthew Gustafson, Luzi Hail, Sam Hartzmark (discussant), Mirko Heinle, Burton Hollifield, Bob Holthausen, Jack Hughes, Peter Iliev, Andy Koch, Kalin Kolev, Jason Kotter, Rick Lambert, Alina Lerman, Christian Leuz, Guoyu Lin, Valeri Nikolaev, Marios Panayides, K. We are especially grateful to our discussant and referee, Joseph Gerakos, and our editor, John Core. Navigate Left Previous article in issue.This reduction occurred despite an increase in benefits, consistent with the market rationally becoming less skeptical of firms that just meet benchmarks.

To play this game, you post on your wall that you want your friends to message you with a. Finally, we use the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as a policy experiment and find that by increasing costs, the Act reduced equilibrium earnings management by 36%. A stupid ass trend/game/fad that has recently popped up on Facebook. The estimated model parameters yield the percentage of manipulating firms, magnitude of manipulation, noise in manipulation, and sufficient statistics to evaluate proxies for identifying firms suspected of manipulation. We develop a new structural methodology to estimate the model and uncover the unobserved cost function. By placing a NUMBERS GAME bet, bettors agree to abide by Massachusetts State Lottery Commission Rules and Regulations.

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